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Abstract. This paper introduces the first bounded model checking (BMC)
algorithm for hyperproperties expressed in HyperLTL. Just as the classic
BMC technique for LTL primarily aiming at finding bugs, our approach
also targets identifying counterexamples. LTL describes the property of
individual traces and BMC for LTL is reduced to SAT solving. HyperLTL
allows explicit and simultaneous quantification over traces and describes
the property of multiple traces and, hence, our BMC approach naturally
reduces to QBF solving. We report on successful and efficient model
checking of a rich set of experiments on a variety of case studies, includ-
ing security/privacy, concurrent data structures, and path planning in
robotics applications.
1 Introduction
Hyperproperties [9] have been shown to be a powerful framework for specify-
ing and reasoning about important sets of requirements that were not possible
with trace-based languages such as the classic temporal logics. Examples in-
clude information-flow security, consistency models in concurrent computing [5],
and robustness models in cyber-physical systems [30]. The temporal logic Hy-
perLTL [8] extends LTL by allowing explicit and simultaneous quantification
over execution traces, describing the property of multiple traces. For example,
observational determinism can be specified by the following HyperLTL formula:
∀pi.∀pi′.(opi ↔ o′pi)W ¬(ipi ↔ i′pi)
stipulates that every pair of traces pi and pi′ have to agree on the value of the
(public) output o as long as they agree on the value of the (secret) input i, where
‘W ’ denotes the weak until operator.
There has been a recent surge of model checking techniques for HyperLTL
specifications [8,11,20,22]. These approaches employ various techniques (e.g., al-
ternating automata, model counting, strategy synthesis, etc) to verify hyperprop-
erties. However, they generally fall short in proposing an effective method to deal
with identifying bugs with respect to alternating HyperLTL formulas. Indeed,
quantifier alternation has been shown to generally elevate the complexity class of
model checking HyperLTL specifications in different shapes of Kripke structures
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2(KS) [2, 8]. For example, consider the simple Kripke structure K in Fig. 1 and
HyperLTL formulas ϕ1 = ∀pi.∀pi′. (api ↔ api′) and ϕ2 = ∀pi.∃pi′. (api 6↔ api′).
Verifying whether K |= ϕ1 can be reduced to building the self-composition of K
(i.e., parallel composition of K with itself) and applying standard LTL model
checking, resulting in worst-case complexity |K|2. In the size of the model. On
the contrary, dealing with formula ϕ2 is not as straightforward. In worst case,
it requires a subset generation to encode the existential quantifier within the
Kripke structure, resulting in |K|.2|K| blow up. In addition, the quantification is
over traces rather than states, adding to the complexity of reasoning.
{a}
sinit
{a}
s1
{a}
s2
{a}
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s4
Fig. 1: A Kripke structure.
Following the great success of bounded model checking (BMC) for LTL spec-
ifications [7], in this paper, we propose the first BMC algorithm for HyperLTL.
Just as BMC for LTL is reduced to SAT solving to search for a counterexample
trace whose length is bounded by some integer k, we reduce BMC for Hyper-
LTL to QBF solving to be able to deal with quantified counterexample traces
in the input model. More formally, given a Kripke structure K and HyperLTL
formula (for example, of the form) ϕ = ∀pi.∃pi′.ψ, the reduction involves three
main components. First, the transition relation of K is represented by a Boolean
encoding JKK with a separate copy for each quantifier in ϕ. Secondly, the inner
LTL subformula ψ is translated to a Boolean fixpoint representation JψK in a
similar fashion to the standard BMC technique for LTL. This way, the QBF
encoding roughly appears as:
JK,¬ϕKk = ∃(x0, x1, . . . , xn).∀(y0, y1, . . . , yn).JK0Kk ∧ (JK1Kk ! J¬ψKk) (1)
where Boolean variables x0 · · ·xn (respectively, y0 · · · yn) encode K with respect
to the universal (respectively, existential) trace quantifier in ϕ, JK0Kk (respec-
tively, JK1Kk) is the unrolling of K for the universal (respectively, existential)
quantifier in ϕ, and JψK is the fixpoint Boolean encoding of ψ. It is straightfor-
ward to extend QBF encoding (1) to any HyperLTL formula.
While this QBF encoding is a natural generalization of BMC for HyperLTL,
there are subtle issues with respect to satisfiability of JK,¬ϕKk and soundness
of our approach that needs to be addressed. For instance, consider a HyperLTL
formula of the form ϕ = ∀pi.∃pi′.ψ, where ψ is a safety LTL subformula. This
means that in ¬ϕ, ¬ψ is a co-safety LTL formula. Thus, in our QBF encod-
ing (1), if the solver finds a witness to the existential quantifier over x0 · · ·xn
3and concludes satisfiability of the formula, we have a counterexample. In this
setting, unstatisfiability means up to bound k, there is no bug, but we cannot
make a general verification conclusion. On the contrary, suppose ψ is a co-safety
LTL formula and the QBF solver reports unsatifiability. This means that K is
indeed a model of ϕ. As can be seen satisfiability and unsatisfiability for different
formulas have different meanings. In order to interpret the outcome the QBF
solver and relate it to the original model checking decision problem, we propose
three orthogonal semantics for BMC for HyperLTL. In the pessimistic semantics
(which is the common for LTL BMC) pending eventualities are considered to
be unfulfilled. The optimistic semantics considers the dual case, where pending
eventualities are considered to be fulfilled. Bounded semantics use additional in-
formation about the system: if the system has reached termination, then the
final state will repeated ad infini- tum, so if all traces have terminated, then the
verdict can be decided.
We have fully implemented our technique the the tool HyperQube. Our ex-
perimental evaluation includes a rich set of case studies, such information-flow
security/privacy, concurrent data structures (in particular, linearizability), and
path planning in robotics applications. Our evaluation shows that our technique
is effective and efficient in finding bugs in several prominent examples. We also
show that our approach can also be used as as tool for synthesis. Indeed, a wit-
ness to an existential quantifier in a HyperLTL formula is an execution path that
satisfy the formula. Our experiments on path planning for robots show cases this
feature of HyperCube.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Kripke Structures
Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions and Σ = 2AP be the alphabet. A
letter is an element of Σ. A trace t ∈ Σω over alphabet Σ is an infinite sequence
of letters: t = t(0)t(1)t(2) . . .
Definition 1. A Kripke structure is a tuple K = 〈S, sinit , δ, L〉, where
– S is a finite set of states;
– sinit ∈ S is the initial state;
– δ ⊆ S × S is a transition relation, and
– L : S ! Σ is a labeling function on the states of K.
We require that for each s ∈ S, there exists s′ ∈ S, such that (s, s′) ∈ δ.
Figure 1 shows an example Kripke structure where L(sinit) = {a}, L(s3) =
{b}, etc. The size of the Kripke structure is the number of its states. The directed
graph F = 〈S, δ〉 is called the Kripke frame of the Kripke structure K. A loop in
F is a finite sequence s0s1 · · · sn, such that (si, si+1) ∈ δ, for all 0 ≤ i < n, and
(sn, s0) ∈ δ. We call a Kripke frame acyclic, if the only loops are self-loops on
4otherwise terminal states, i.e., on states that have no other outgoing transition.
See Fig. 1 for an example. Since Definition 1 does not allow terminal states, we
only consider acyclic Kripke structures with such added self-loops.
We call a Kripke frame tree-shaped, or, in short, a tree, if every state s has a
unique state s′ with (s′, s) ∈ δ, except for the root node, which has no predeces-
sor, and the leaf nodes, which, again because of Definition 1, additionally have
a self-loop but no other outgoing transitions.
A path of a Kripke structure is an infinite sequence of states s(0)s(1) · · · ∈ Sω,
such that:
– s(0) = sinit , and
– (s(i), s(i+ 1)) ∈ δ, for all i ≥ 0.
A trace of a Kripke structure is a trace t(0)t(1)t(2) · · · ∈ Σω, such that there
exists a path s(0)s(1) · · · ∈ Sω with t(i) = L(s(i)) for all i ≥ 0. We denote by
Traces(K, s) the set of all traces of K with paths that start in state s ∈ S.
In some cases, the system at hand is given as a tree-shaped or acyclic Kripke
structure. Examples include session-based security protocols and space-efficient
execution logs, because trees allow us to organize the traces according to common
prefixes and acyclic graphs according to both common prefixes and common
suffixes.
2.2 The Temporal Logic HyperLTL
HyperLTL [8] is an extension of linear-time temporal logic (LTL) for hyperprop-
erties. The syntax of HyperLTL formulas is defined inductively by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= ∃pi.ϕ | ∀pi.ϕ | φ
φ ::= true | api | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | φ U φ | φ
where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and pi is a trace variable from an infinite
supply of variables V. The Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ have the usual meaning,
U is the temporal until operator and is the temporal next operator. We
also consider the usual derived Boolean connectives, such as ∧, ⇒, and ⇔, and
the derived temporal operators eventually ϕ ≡ true U ϕ and globally ϕ ≡
¬ ¬ϕ. The quantified formulas ∃pi and ∀pi are read as ‘along some trace pi’ and
‘along all traces pi’, respectively.
Standard Semantics. The semantics of HyperLTL is defined with respect to a
trace assignment, a partial mapping Π : V ! Σω. The assignment with empty
domain is denoted by Π∅. Given a trace assignment Π, a trace variable pi,
and a concrete trace t ∈ Σω, we denote by Π[pi ! t] the assignment that
coincides with Π everywhere but at pi, which is mapped to trace t. Further-
more, Π[j,∞] denotes the assignment mapping each trace pi in Π’s domain to
Π(pi)(j)Π(pi)(j + 1)Π(pi)(j + 2) · · · . The satisfaction of a HyperLTL formula ϕ
5over a trace assignment Π and a set of traces T ⊆ Σω, denoted by T,Π |= ϕ, is
defined as follows:
T,Π |= true
T,Π |= api iff a ∈ Π(pi)(0),
T,Π |= ¬ψ iff T,Π 6|= ψ,
T,Π |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff T,Π |= ψ1 or T,Π |= ψ2,
T,Π |= ψ iff T,Π[1,∞] |= ψ,
T,Π |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff ∃i ≥ 0 : T,Π[i,∞] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀j ∈ [0, i) : T,Π[j,∞] |= ψ1,
T,Π |= ∃pi. ψ iff ∃t ∈ T : T,Π[pi ! t] |= ψ,
T,Π |= ∀pi. ψ iff ∀t ∈ T : T,Π[pi ! t] |= ψ.
We say that a set T of traces satisfies a sentence ϕ, denoted by T |= φ, if
T,Π∅ |= ϕ. If the set T is generated by a Kripke structure K, we write K |= ϕ.
Multi-model Semantics. In this paper we use a slightly different semantics for
HyperLTL formulas to allow comparing traces from different models We still
use trace mapping Π : V ! Σω as before. But we now consider different sets
of traces T (pi), with one set of traces for each trace variable pi. Formally, T is
a total function V ! 2αω . We call T a multi-interpretation. As before, given a
trace assignment Π, a trace variable pi, and a concrete trace t ∈ Σω, we denote
by Π[pi ! t] the assignment that coincides with Π everywhere but at pi, which is
mapped to trace t. Furthermore, Π[j,∞] denotes the assignment mapping each
trace pi in Π’s domain to Π(pi)(j)Π(pi)(j + 1)Π(pi)(j + 2) · · · . The satisfaction
of a HyperLTL formula ϕ over a trace assignment Π and a multi-interpretation
T : V ! 2Σω , denoted by T,Π |= ϕ, is defined as follows:
T,Π |= true
T,Π |= api iff a ∈ Π(pi)(0),
T,Π |= ¬ψ iff T,Π 6|= ψ,
T,Π |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff T,Π |= ψ1 or T,Π |= ψ2,
T,Π |= ψ iff T,Π[1,∞] |= ψ,
T,Π |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff ∃i ≥ 0 : T,Π[i,∞] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀j ∈ [0, i) : T,Π[j,∞] |= ψ1,
T,Π |= ∃pi. ψ iff ∃t ∈ T (pi) : T,Π[pi ! t] |= ψ,
T,Π |= ∀pi. ψ iff ∀t ∈ T (pi) : T,Π[pi ! t] |= ψ.
We say that a multi-interpretation T satisfies a sentence ϕ, denoted by T |= φ,
if T,Π∅ |= ϕ, and we say that the mult-interpretation T is a multi-model of φ.
If each set T (pi) is generated by a family of Kripke structures with one K(pi) per
variable pi, we write K |= ϕ. Note that by choosing the same set of traces for each
variable (i.e. T (pi) = T (pi′) for each pi, pi′) we recover the standard semantics of
HyperLTL.
2.3 Quantified Boolean Formula Satisfiability
The quantified Boolean formula (QBF) satisfiability problem [23] is the following:
6Given is a set of Boolean variables, {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, and a quantified
Boolean formula
y = Q1x1.Q2x2 . . .Qn−1xn−1.Qnxn.ψ
where each Qi ∈ {∀,∃} (i ∈ [1, n]) and ψ is an arbitrary Boolean formula
over variables {x1, . . . , xn}. Is y true?
Figure 2 shows a satisfying model for formula:
y = ∃x1.∀x2.∃x3.∃x4.∀x5.(x1∨¬x2∨x3)∧(¬x1∨x2∨¬x4)∧(¬x3∨x4∨¬x5)∧(x1∨x4∨x5).
T
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Fig. 2: Model for the QBF formula.
3 Bounded Semantics of HyperLTL
In this section we present the bounded semantics of HyperLTL
3.1 Bounded Semantics
We assume the formula is closed and has n quantifiers Q1 . . .Qn, and it has been
converted into negation-normal form (NNF) so that the negation symbol only
occurs in front of atomic symbols ¬api. We describe in this section how different
QBF queries can be generated, depending on the structure of the formula, and
what can be inferred in each case from the outcome of the QBF solver about the
model-checking problem.
The main idea of bounded model-checking is to perform incremental explo-
ration of the state space of the systems by unrolling the systems and the formula
up-to a bound.
Let k ≥ 0 be the unrolling bound and let 〈T1 . . . Tn〉 be a collection of finite
sets of finite traces, one per path variable. We use T (pil) to refer to Tl, the set
of traces that pil can range over. Our intention is to define satisfaction relation
7|=k between models (T,Π, i) and formulas for a bounded exploration k. We
will defined two different finite satisfaction relations for general models: |=pesk
(pessimistic) and |=optk (optimistic) and their variants for models that inform
about the termination of traces |=hpesk and |=hoptk . These semantics differ in how
to interpret the possible unseen future events after the bound of observation k.
All semantics coincide in the interpretations quantifiers and Boolean connectives
at all points, and in the interpretations of the temporal operators up-to instant
k − 1:
Quantifiers. For every i ≤ k:
(T,Π, 0) |=k ∃pi. ψ iff there is a t ∈ T (pi) : (T,Π[pi ! t], 0) |=k ψ, (1)
(T,Π, 0) |=k ∀pi. ψ iff for all t ∈ T (pi) : (T,Π[pi ! t], 0) |=k ψ. (2)
Boolean operators. For every i ≤ k:
(T,Π, i) |=k true iff always holds (3)
(T,Π, i) |=k api iff a ∈ Π(pi)(i), (4)
(T,Π, i) |=k ¬api iff a 6∈ Π(pi)(i), (5)
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 or (T,Π, i) |=k ψ2, (6)
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff (T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 and (T,Π, i) |=k ψ2 (7)
Temporal connectives for (i < k).
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ iff (T,Π, i+ 1) |=k ψ (8)
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 U ψ2 iff (T,Π, i) |=k ψ2, or
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 and (T,Π, i+ 1) |=k ψ1 U ψ2 (9)
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ1Rψ2 iff (T,Π, i) |=k ψ2, and
(T,Π, i) |=k ψ1 or (T,Π, i+ 1) |=k ψ1Rψ2 (10)
Temporal connectives for (i = k). In this case we distinguish the different se-
mantics. In the pessimistic semantics the eventualities (including ) are assumed
to never be fulfilled:
(T,Π, k) |=pesk ψ iff never happens (P1)
(T,Π, k) |=pesk ψ1 U ψ2 iff never happens (P2)
(T,Π, k) |=pesk ψ1Rψ2 iff never happens (P3)
On the other hand, in the optimistic semantics the eventualities are assumed to
be fulfilled in the future:
(T,Π, k) |=optk ψ iff always happens (O1)
(T,Π, k) |=optk ψ1 U ψ2 iff always happens (O2)
(T,Π, k) |=optk ψ1Rψ2 iff always happens (O3)
In order to capture the halting semantics, we assume that the Kripke struc-
ture is equipped with a predicate halt that is true if the state corresponds to a
8halting state, and define the auxiliary predicate halted def=
∧
pi haltpi. Introduce
haltpi before Then, the bounded semantics of the temporal case for i = k in
the pessimistic case consider the halting case to infer the actual value of the
temporal operators on the (now fully known) trace:
(T,Π, k) |=hpesk ψ iff (T,Π, k) |=k halted and (T,Π, k) |=hpesk ψ (BP1)
(T,Π, k) |=hpesk ψ1 U ψ2 iff (T,Π, k) |=k halted and (T,Π, k) |=hpesk ψ2 (BP2)
(T,Π, k) |=hpesk ψ1Rψ2 iff (T,Π, k) |=k halted and (T,Π, k) |=hpesk ψ1 (BP3)
Dually, in the halting optimistic case:
(T,Π, k) |=hoptk ψ iff (T,Π, k) 6|=k halted or (T,Π, k) |=hoptk ψ (BO1)
(T,Π, k) |=hoptk ψ1 U ψ2 iff (T,Π, k) 6|=k halted or (T,Π, k) |=hoptk ψ2 (BO2)
(T,Π, k) |=hoptk ψ1Rψ2 iff (T,Π, k) 6|=k halted or (T,Π, k) |=hoptk ψ1 (BO3)
Now we are ready to define the four semantics:
– |=pesk : the pessimistic semantics use (1)-(10) and (P1)-(P3).
– |=optk : the optimistic semantics use (1)-(10) and (O1)-(O3).
– |=hpesk : the bounded pessimistic semantics use (1)-(10) and (BP1)-(BP3).
– |=hoptk : the bounded optimistic semantics use (1)-(10) and (BO1)-(BO3).
The pessimistic semantics is the semantics in the traditional LTL BMC,
where pending eventualities are considered to be unfulfilled. In the pessimistic
semantics a formula is declared false unless it is witnessed to be true within
the bound explored. In other words, formulas can only get “truer” with more
information obtained by a longer unrolling. Introduce example with Gp (which
is false) and Fp (which is equivalent to a big disjunction). Dually, the optimistic
semantics considers a formula true unless there is evidence within the bounded
exploration on the contrary. Therefore, formulas only get “false” with further
unrolling. The following lemma formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 1. Let k ≤ j. Then,
1. If (T,Π, 0) |=pesk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) |=pesj ϕ.
2. If (T,Π, 0) 6|=optk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) 6|=optj ϕ.
3. If (T,Π, 0) |=hpesk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) |=hpesj ϕ.
4. If (T,Π, 0) 6|=hoptk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) 6|=hoptj ϕ.
In turn, the verdict obtained from the exploration up-to k can (in some
cases) be used to infer the verdict of the model checking problem. As in classical
BMC, if the pessimistic semantics find a model, then it is a model. Similarly, if
the optimistic semantics fail to find a model, then there is no model. The next
lemma formally captures this intuition
Lemma 2 (Infinite inference). The following hold for every k,
1. If (T,Π, 0) |=pesk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) |= ϕ.
2. If (T,Π, 0) 6|=optk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) 6|= ϕ.
3. If (T,Π, 0) |=hpesk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) |= ϕ.
94. If (T,Π, 0) 6|=hoptk ϕ then (T,Π, 0) 6|= ϕ.
3.2 Examples
4 Reducing BMC to QBF
Given a Kripke structureK = 〈S, sinit , δ, L〉, a HyperLTL formula ϕ = Q1pi1.Q2pi2 · · ·Qnpin.ψ,
and a bound k ≥ 0, we will construct a quantified Boolean formula JK, ϕKk. The
unrolling of the transition relation of the Kripke structure up to bound k is the
following:
JKKk = I(sinit) ∧ k−1∧
i=0
δ(si, si+1)
This is done in the same fashion as in classic BMC for LTL.
The Construction of the inner LTL formula is analogous to standard BMC
as well. In particular, we introduce the following inductive construction.
– Inductive Case: for all i ≤ k:
JppiKik := pipiJ¬ppiKik := ¬pipiJψ1 ∨ ψ2Kik := Jψ1Kik ∨ Jψ2KikJψ1 ∧ ψ2Kik := Jψ1Kik ∧ Jψ2KikJψ1 U ψ2Kik := Jψ2Kik ∨ (Jψ1Kik ∧ Jψ1 U ψ2Ki+1k )Jψ1 R ψ2Kik := Jψ2Kik ∧ (Jψ1Kik ∨ Jψ1 R ψ2Ki+1k )J ψKik := JψKi+1k
– Base case:
JψKk+1k := false
Combining all components, the encoding of the HyperLTL BMC problem in
QBF is the following:
JK, ϕKk = Q1.Q2 · · ·Qn.(JK1Kk ◦1 JK2Kk ◦2 · · · ◦n−1 JKnKk ◦n JψK0k)
where
◦i =
{
∧ if Qi = ∃
! if Qi = ∀
For example, if ϕ is ∀pi.∃pi′.ψ. Let x = {pipi|0 ≤ i ≤ k, p ∈ AP} and y =
{pipi′ |0 ≤ i ≤ k, p ∈ AP}.
JK, ϕKk = ∀x.∃y.(JK1Kk ! (JK2Kk ∧ JψK0k))
Similarly, take ϕ is ∃pi.∀pi′.ψ. Let x = {pipi|0 ≤ i ≤ k, p ∈ AP} and y =
{pipi′ |0 ≤ i ≤ k, p ∈ AP}.
10
JK, ϕKk = ∃x.∀y.(JK1Kk ∧ (JK2Kk ! JψK0k))
The following holds for the last formula ϕ : ∃pi∀pi′.ψ. If JK, ϕKk holds for a
given k then there is a finite trace σ1 of length k of K1 such that for all traces
σ2 of length k of K2, (σ1, σ2) |=0k ψ.
5 Evaluation and Case Studies
In this section, we evaluate our technique using a rich set of case studies including
verification of symmetry, linearizability, non-interference, and non-repudiation.
We also used our technique in path planning in robotics as well as test case
generation for mutation testing. Our tool HyperQube works as follows. Given a
transition relation, we automatically unfold it up to some bound k ≥ 0 using a
home-grown tool written in Ocaml. The unfolded transition relation along with
the QBF encoding of input HyperLTL formula will form a complete QBF in-
stance which will then be fed to the QBF solver Quabs [25]. All experiments in
this section are run on an iMac desktop with XXX CPU and XXX RAM.
5.1 Case study 1: Symmetry in the Bakery Algorithm
We first investigate the symmetry property in Lamport’s Bakery algorithm for
enforcing mutual exclusion in a concurrent program. The algorithm works as
follows. When a process intends to enter the critical section, a ticket with a
special number will be drawn by the process. When more than one process
requests to enter the critical section, the process with the smallest ticket number
enters first, while other processes wait. In a concurrent program, it is also possible
that two or more processes hold tickets with same number if they drew tickets at
the same time. To solve this, while ticket comparison is a tie, we let the process
with smaller process ID enter the critical section first and keep others in waiting.
We now consider the symmetry property, where if there is no specific process
in a program that owns special privilege. We use atomic proposition select to
represent the process selected to proceed in the next state, and pause to indicate
if the prcoess is not moving. Each process Pn has a program counter denoted
by pc(Pn). The symmetry property of the bakery algorithm is the following. For
all traces pi, there exists a trace pi′, such that if both traces pause together and
both select the next process to execute symmetrically, then the program counter
of each process would be completely symmetric as well. For example, for two
processes P0 and P1, trace pi selects P0 iff trace pi′ selects P1, and pi selects
P1 iff pi′ selects P0. Such a scenario is presented as sym(selectpi, selectpi′). We
now describe the specification as the following HyperLTL formula:
Symmetry
ϕsym = ∀pi.∃pi′.
(
sym(selectpi, selectpi′) ∧ (pausepi = pausepi′) ∧(
pc(P0)pi = pc(P1)pi′
) ∧ (pc(P1)pi = pc(P0)pi′))
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Now, observe that the negation of the above formula is:
¬Symmetry
¬ϕsym = ∃pi.∀pi′.
(
¬sym(selectpi, selectpi′) ∨ (pausepi 6= pausepi′) ∨
(pc(P0)pi 6= pc(P1)pi′) ∨ (pc(P1)pi 6= pc(P0)pi′)
)
In this case study, HyperQube returns SAT, which indicates that there exists a
trace that satisfy ¬ϕsym . The returned trace represents a witness in the Bakery
algorithm that violates symmetry and thus falsifies the original formula ϕsym .
That is, the Bakery algorithm does not satisfy symmetry.
5.2 Case study 2: Linearizability in SNARK Algorithm
Next, we investigate linearizability property in SNARK algorithm. Linearizabil-
ity is a correctness property for concurrent program. In a concurrent system, a
history is a collection of method invocations and response executed by different
threads. We say that a history is linearizable [26], if there exists a sequential order
of invocations and responses, such that the responses are returned with atomic
executions of the whole method. A concurrent program satisfies linearizability if
all possible histories are linearizable. In [5], the authors show that linearizability
is a hyperproperty of the form ∀∃, where the domain of the universal quantifier
is over all possible executions of the concurrent data structure and the domain of
the existential quantifier is over all possible executions of the sequential imple-
mentation of the data structure. Thus, reasoning about linearizability requires
our multi-model semantics introduced in Section 2.
The SNARK algorithm [12] is a concurrent implementation of a double-ended
queue data structure. It uses double-compare-and-swap (DCAS) with doubly
linked-list that stores values in nodes while each node is connected to its two
neighbors, L and R. When a modification of data happens, e.g., by invoking
pushRight() or popLeft(), SNARK conducts DCAS by comparing two memory
locations to decide if such modification is appropriate.
We define the hyperproperty of linearizability using two different models. Let
pim denote the trace variable over the traces of the model (in this case SNARK).
This model allows multiple threads to execute each method with interleavings.
Let pis represents the trace variable over traces of the sequential implementation
of a double-ended queue (i.e., the specification), where only atomic invocations
are allowed. The HyperLTL formula specifying a linearizable program is as fol-
lows:
Linearizability ϕlinearizability = ∀pim.∃pis. (historypim ↔ historypis)
The negation of the above formula is:
¬ Linearizability ¬ϕlinearizability = ∃pim.∀pis. (historypim 6↔ historypis)
In this case study, HyperQube returns SAT, indicating that a witness of lineariz-
ability violation has been found in SNARK algorithm. The returned trace is a
history that cannot be performed when only atomic executions are allowed. The
bug we identified by using HyperQube is the same as the one reported in [12].
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5.3 Case study 3: Non-interference in Typed Multi-threaded
Programs
We also investigate non-interference in a multi-threaded program with type sys-
tem. As a security policy, non-interference guarantees that low-security variables
are independent from the high-security variables, thus, preserving secure infor-
mation flow. For a concurrent program, a type system classifies each variable
as either high or low security, labeled as high-variable and low-variable. Non-
interference requires that all information about a high-variable cannot be inferred
by observing any the value of a low-variable. In this case study, we look at a
concurrent system example in [28], which contains three threads α, β, and ω.
The variables are assigned with different security level as follows. PIN, trigger0,
and trigger1 are classified as high-variable, and maintrigger, mask, and result
are low-variables. In a multi-threaded setting, assuming that thread scheduling
is fair, the program satisfies non-interference, if for all executions, there exists
another one such that they start from different high-inputs (i.e., the values of
PIN are not equal) and at termination point, they are in low-equivalent states
(i.e., the values of Result are equal).
Furthermore, in order to search for a witness of non-interference violation in
bounded time, we also consider the termination bound introduced in Section 3. In
this particular program, the execution terminates when the low-variable MASK
contains value zero. The corresponding HyperLTL formula is as follows:
NI
ϕNI = ∀pi.∃pi′.
(
PIN pi 6= PIN pi′
) ∧ ((¬terminatepi ∨ ¬terminatepi′)
U ((terminatepi ∧ terminatepi′) ∧ (Resultpi = Resultpi′)))
where atomic proposition terminate denotes the terminating state (MASK con-
tains a zero bit) and by abuse of notation PIN pi (respectively, Resultpi) denotes
the value of PIN (respectively, Result) in trace pi. The negated formula for BMC
is then:
¬NI
¬ϕNI = ∃pi.∀pi′.
(
PIN pi 6= PIN pi′
)
!
(
(terminatepi ∧ terminatepi′)
R ((¬terminatepi ∨ ¬terminatepi′) ∨ (Resultpi 6= Resultpi′)))
In this case study, HyperQube returns SAT, indicating that there is a trace
we can detect the difference of high-variable by observing low variable, that
is, violating non-interference by 27 unrollings. Moreover, by taking terminating
bound into consideration, further unrollings of transition relation will not affect
the result of original model checking problem.
5.4 Case study 4: Fairness in Non-repudiation Protocols
A non-repudiation protocol consists of three parties: a message sender (A), a mes-
sage receiver (B), and a trusted third party T . In a message exchange event, the
message receiver should obtain a receipt from the sender, named non-repudiation
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of origin (NRO), and the message sender should end up having an evidence
named non-repudiation of receipt (NRR). A fair non-repudiation protocol guar-
antees that two parties can exchange messages fairly without any party being
able to deny sending out evidence while having received an evidence. The three
participants can take the following actions:
ActA = {A! B : m,A! T : m,A! B : NRO , A! T : NRO , A : skip}
ActB = {B ! A : NRR, B ! T : NRR, B : skip}
ActT = {T ! A : NRR, T ! B : NRO , T : skip}
We say that a trace is effective if message, NRR, and NRO are all received.
Assuming that each party will take turns and take different actions, the fairness
of non-repudiation protocol can be presented as hyperproperty as follows. There
exists an effective trace pi, such that for all other traces pi′, if A in both traces
always take the same action while B behave arbitrarily, or both B take the
same action and A behave arbitrarily, then for pi′, eventually NRR gets received
by A if and only if NRO gets received by B. The complete specification for
non-repudiation is the following:
Fairness
ϕfair = ∃pi.∀pi′. ( mpi) ∧ ( NRRpi) ∧ ( NROpi) ∧(
(
∧
a∈ActA api ↔ api′) !
(
( NRRpi′)↔ ( NROpi′)
)) ∧(
(
∧
a∈ActB api ↔ api′) !
(
( NRRpi′)↔ ( NROpi′)
))
Observe that trace pi expresses effectiveness (i.e., an honest behvavior of all
parties), while trace pi′ is a trace that behaves similarly to trace pi as far as the
actions of A or B are concerned while ensuring fair receipt of NRR and NRO .
The negated formula for BMC is then:
¬ Fairness
¬ϕfair = ∀pi.∃pi′. ¬
(
( mpi) ∧ ( NRRpi) ∧ ( NROpi)
)∨(
(
∧
a∈ActA api ↔ api′) ∧ ¬
(
( NRRpi′)↔ ( NROpi′)
))∨(
(
∧
a∈ActB api ↔ api′) ∧ ¬
(
( NRRpi′)↔ ( NROpi′)
))
In this case study, we evaluate two different models of trusted third party
from [27]. First, we pick an incorrect implementation in [27], named Tincorrect ,
which B can choose not to send out NRR after receiving NRO . We obtain a SAT
result from HyperQube. The challenge with a SAT result with a ∀∃ formula is that
the solver understandably does not return an witness. Thus, a SAT result can be
either due to non-existence of an effective trace or the fact that all conforming
traces are unfair. To clarify this, one can verify the protocol with respect to
formula ∃pi.( mpi ∧ NRRpi ∧ NROpi). This step was successful, meaning that
an effective trace exists. This means that the original SAT result indicates that
the protocol includes an unfair trace.
On the contrary, the implementation named Tcorrect in [27], where T always
guarantees the message exchange event is fair between the two parties, Hyper-
Qube returns UNSAT. This result indicates that all traces in the correct system
satisfies fairness in non-repudiation.
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5.5 Case study 5: Privacy-Preserving Path Planning for Robots
In addition to model checking problems, inspired by the work in [31], we also ex-
plore other applications that involve hyperproperties with quantifier alternation.
One such application is searching the optimal solution for robotic planning. For
example, given a map with an initial state and a goal state, the shortest path
from initial state to goal state is a traces pi, such that pi can reach the goal state
and for all other traces pi′, pi′ should not reach the goal state until pi reached
it. In other words, the shortest path is a path on the map that reaches the goal
state before all other paths did. We express this specification as the following
hyperproperty:
Shortest Path ϕsp = ∃pi.∀pi′.(¬goalpi′ U goalpi)
where the atomic proposition goal denotes that the path has reached the goal
state.
By enforcing the above formula directly with a map modelBB: Should we
call it synthesis?, HyperQube returns SAT. The returned path represents a path
that can reach the goal state from the initial state with least steps compared
to all other paths on the same map. To further analyze the result, we also
consider the terminating bound with the formula. An optimal path searching
should terminate when the shortest path is found because when a shortest path
has been discovered on the map, any further exploration will not affect the
returning value.
Besides optimal solution searching, HyperLTL also allows us to specify the
robustness of paths that are derived by uncertainty in robotic planning. For
example, instead of one single initial state, we now consider a map with a set of
initial states. We are interested in a strategy that can help all traces to reach
the goal state regardless which initial state the path start from. A robustness
strategy searching problem can be presented as follows. There exists a robust
path pi, such that for all paths pi′ starting from any initial state, pi′ is able to
reach the goal state using the same strategy as pi. Let the notation of strategy
represent a sequential of movements the path took (i.e. move up, down, left, or
right.). We write the formula as follows:
Robustness ϕrb = ∃pi.∀pi′. (strategypi′ ↔ strategypi)! (goalpi ∧ goalpi′)
By enforcing the above formula directly with the map model, HyperQube
returns SAT, which indicates that a robustness path has been found. The re-
turned path represents a strong strategy that all paths starting from different
initial state can guarantee of goal reachability using the same strategy.
5.6 Case study 6: Generate Mutants in Mutation Testing
Another application of hyperproperty with quantifier alternation is for efficiently
generating test suite for mutation testing [13] We look at the beverage machine
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Fig. 3: Shortest Path Fig. 4: Robust Strategy Fig. 5: Private Strategy
model in this paper. The beverage machine has three possible inputs: request,
fill, or none. Based on the input, the machine may output coffee, tea, or none. We
also use an atomic proposition mut to mark mutated traces, and ¬mut for non-
mutated traces. In this non-deterministic model, a potentially killable mutants
for mutation testing is a mutated trace pi such that, for all other non-mutated
pi′ who have same inputs as pi, the outputs will eventually diverge.
Mutant in
Non-deterministic Model ∃pi∀pi
′(mutpi ∧ ¬mutpi′) ∧
(
(inputpi ↔ inputpi′) U (outputpi 6↔ outputpi′)
)
HyperQube returns SAT with the above formula. The returned path represents a
valid mutant for mutation testing. Our experiment result shows that HyperQube
is able to output a mutant with given formula in a very short amount of time,
which provides an efficient solution for test suite generation of mutation testing.
5.7 Summary Table
6 Related Work
There has been a lot of recent progress in automatically verifying [11, 20–22]
and monitoring [1,5,6,18,19,24,29] HyperLTL specifications. HyperLTL is also
supported by a growing set of tools, including the model checker MCHyper [11,
22], the satisfiability checkers EAHyper [17] and MGHyper [15], and the runtime
monitoring tool RVHyper [18].
The complexity of the model checking for HyperLTL for tree-shaped, acyclic,
and general graphs was rigorously investigated in [2]. The first algorithms for
model checking HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ using alternating automata were in-
troduced in [22]. These technique, however, were not able to deal with alternating
HyperLTL formulas in a fully automated fashion. These algorithms were then
extended to deal with hyperliveness and alternating formulas in [11] by finding a
winning strategy in ∀∃ games. In this paper, we take an alternative approach by
reducing the model checking problem to QBF solving, which is arguably more
effective for finding bugs.
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Table 1: Case studies results of BMC for hyperproperties using HyperQube
Model Original ϕ #unroll semantics QBF result genqbf [s] QuAbS [s]
Bakery
3 processes ∀∀ (sym1) 49 PES SAT 6.25 0.64
Bakery
3 processes ∀∀ (sym2) 144 PES SAT 71.47 14.40
Bakery
3 processes ∀∀ (sym3) 50 OPT UNSAT 7.76 23.66
Bakery
3 processes ϕsym 50 PES SAT 6.20 0.57
Bakery
5 processes ϕsym 50 PES SAT 139.64 27.06
SNARK
bug1 ϕlinearizability 26 PES SAT 88.42 383.60
SNARK
bug2 ϕlinearizability 40 PES SAT 718.09 779.76
3-Thread
program ϕNI 57 terminating-PES SAT 8.67 79.36
Non-repudiation
Protocol
(Tincorrect)
ϕfair 15 terminating-PES SAT 0.10 0.27
Non-repudiation
Protocol
(Tcorrect)
ϕfair 15 terminating-OPT UNSAT 0.08 0.12
The satisfiability problem for HyperLTL is shown to be undecidable in general
but decidable for the ∃∗∀∗ fragment and for any fragment that includes a ∀∃
quantifier alternation [14]. The hierarchy of hyperlogics beyond HyperLTL has
been studied in [10]. The synthesis problem for HyperLTL has been studied in
problem in [3] in the form of program repair, in [4] in the form of controller
synthesis, and in [16] for the general case.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced the first bounded model checking (BMC) technique
for verification of hyperproperties expressed in HyperLTL. To this end, we pro-
posed three different semantics that jointly ensure the soundness of our approach.
To handle trace quantification in HyperLTL, we reduced the BMC problem to
checking satisfiability of quantified Boolean formulas (QBF). This is analogous
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Table 2: Case studies results of hyperproperties for robotic planning using Hy-
perQube, in comparison with the experimental results in [11]
title of Table
#unroll gen [s] Z3 [s] Total[s] genqbf [s] QuAbS [s] Total [s]
Shortest path
(map size : 102)
20 8.31 0.33 8.64 1.30 0.57 1.87
Shortest path
(map size : 202)
40 124.66 6.41 131.06 4.53 12.16 16.69
Shortest path
(map size : 402)
80 1093.12 72.99 1166.11 36.04 35.75 71.79
Shortest path
(map size : 602)
120 4360.75 532.11 4892.86 105.82 120.84 226.66
Initial state robustness
(map size : 102)
20 11.14 0.45 11.59 1.40 0.35 1.75
Initial state robustness
(map size : 202)
40 49.59 2.67 52.26 15.92 15.32 31.14
Initial state robustness
(map size : 402)
80 216.16 19.81 235.97 63.16 20.13 83.29
to the reduction of BMC for LTL to the simple propositional satisfiability prob-
lem. Through a rich set of case studies, we demonstrated the effectiveness and
efficiency of our approach in verification of information-flow properties, lineariz-
ability in concurrent data structures, path planning in robotics, and fairness in
nonrepudiation protocols.
As for future work, our first step is to solve the loop condition problem. This
is necessary to establish completeness conditions for BMC. The application of
QBF-based techniques in the framework of abstraction/refinement is another
unexplored area. Success of BMC for hyperproperties inherently depends on
effectiveness of QBF solvers and since QBF solving is arguably not as mature
as SAT/SMT solving techniques, it is imperative to conduct more research to
enhance the performance of QBF solvers.
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A Pseudo-code of Case Studies
A.1 Bakery Algorithm
Algorithm 1: Bakery
1 init(MAX/ P1.ticket... Pn.ticket/ P1.status... Pn.status):= 0/ 0...0/
noncrit...noncrit ;
2 while true do
3 foreach k in 1...n do
4 if select(Pk) then
5 Pk.ticket = MAX + 1;
6 Pk.status = wait;
7 else if Pk.status = wait then
8 if Pk.ticket = min(P1.ticket... Pn.ticket) then
9 Pk.status = crit ;
10 else
11 Pk.status = wait ;
12 end
13 end
14 end
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A.2 SNARK Algorithm
Algorithm 2: SNARK
1 popRight()
2 while true do
3 rh = RightHat;
4 lh = LeftHat;
5 if rh!R = rh then
6 return "empty";
7 end
8 if rh = lh then
9 if DCAS(&RightHat, &LeftHat, rh, lh, Dummy, Dummy) then
10 return rh !V;
11 end
12 else
13 rhL = rh!L;
14 if DCAS(&RightHat, &rh!L, rh, rhL, rhL, rh) then
15 result = rh!V;
16 rh!R = Dummy;
17 return result;
18 end
19 end
20 popLeft()
21 while true do
22 lh = LeftHat;
23 rh = RightHat;
24 if lh!L = lh then
25 return "empty";
26 end
27 if lh = rh then
28 if DCAS(&LeftHat, &RigtHat, lh, rh, Dummy, Dummy) then
29 return lh !V;
30 end
31 else
32 lhR = lh!R;
33 if DCAS(&LeftHat, &lh!R, lh, lhR, lhR, lh) then
34 result = lh!V;
35 lh!L = Dummy;
36 return result;
37 end
38 end
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39 pushRight()
40 nd = new Node();
41 if nd = null then
42 return "full";
43 nd!R = Dummy;
44 nd!V = v;
45 while true do
46 rh = RightHat;
47 rhR = rh!R;
48 if rhR = rh then
49 nd!L = Dummy;
50 lh = LeftHat; if DCAS(&RightHat, &LeftHat, rh, lh, nd, Dummy)
then
51 return success;
52 else
53 nd!L = rh;
54 if DCAS(&RightHat, &lh!R, rh, rhR, nd, nd) then
55 return success;
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A.3 Typed Multi-threaded Program
Algorithm 3: Typed Multi-threaded Program
1 Thread α:
2 while mask != 0 do
3 while trigger0 = 0 do
4 no-op;
5 end
6 result = result ‖ mask ; // bitwise ’or’
7 trigger0 = 0;
8 maintrigger = matintrigger + 1 ;
9 if maintrigger = 1 then
10 trigger1 = 1;
11 end
12 end
13 Thread β:
14 while mask != 0 do
15 while trigger1 = 0 do
16 no-op;
17 end
18 result = result & !mask ; // bitwise ’and’
19 trigger1 = 0;
20 maintrigger = matintrigger + 1 ;
21 if maintrigger = 1 then
22 trigger0 = 1;
23 end
24 end
25 Thread γ:
26 while mask != 0 do
27 maintrigger = 0 ;
28 if PIN & mask = 0 then
29 trigger0 = 1;
30 else
31 trigger1 = 1;
32 end
33 while maintrigger != 2 do
34 no-op;
35 end
36 mask = mask/2;
37 end
38 trigger0 = 1;
39 trigger1 = 1;
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A.4 Typed Multi-threaded Program
Algorithm 4: Non-repudiation Protocol
1 Tcorrect:
2 (1) skip until A:m!T ;
3 (2) skip until A:NRO!T ;
4 (3) T!B:m ;
5 (4) skip untill B!T: NRR;
6 (5) T!B:NRO;
7 (6) T!A:NRR;
8 Tincorrect:
9 (1) skip until A:m!T ;
10 (2) skip until A:NRO!T ;
11 (3) T!B:m ;
12 (4) T!B:NRO;
13 (5) skip untill B!T: NRR;
14 (6) T!A:NRR;
